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We study the dynamics of an innovative industry in which agents learn about the likelihood
of negative shocks. Managers can exert risk prevention effort to mitigate the consequences
of shocks. If no shock occurs, confidence improves, attracting managers to the innovative
sector. But, when confidence becomes high, inefficient managers exerting low risk-
prevention effort also enter. This stimulates growth, while reducing risk prevention. The
longer the boom, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. Although these dynamics arise in
the first-best, asymmetric information generates excessive entry of inefficient managers,
earning informational rents, inflating the innovative sector, and increasing its vulnerability.
(JEL D82, D86, G01, G2)
As vividly illustrated by the boom and bust of the financial sector in the recent
decade, innovations can spur rapid growth, as well as declining standards,
accumulated risk, and finally crises. The goal of this paper is to shed light on
the dynamics of innovations and risk. Innovations are, by their very nature,
initially untested. Market participants are initially uncertain about the strength,
potential, and workings of an innovation.1 They progressively learn about
it. Innovative resecuritization techniques offer a good illustration of initial
uncertainty and the scope for learning. Collateralized debt obligations of asset
backed securities offered new ways to reallocate risk, potentially enhancing risk
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sharing and liquidity. But the reliability and effectiveness of this innovation was
not fully clear ex ante. It depended, in particular, on the degree of correlation
between the property markets in different American cities, a parameter for
which there was uncertainty. Awareness of uncertainty about the strength of
financial innovations was displayed in a “School Brief” published in 1999 by
The Economist: “Some of the new financial technologies are, in effect, efforts
to bottle up considerable uncertainties. If they work, the world economy will be
more stable. If not, an economic disaster might ensue.” (qtd in The Economist,
September 7, 2013, 57).
Motivated by these stylized facts, we study uncertainty and learning about the
fragility of an innovative industry, that is, the likelihood that it is hit by negative
shock. More precisely, we assume that, with some probability the innovation
is strong, whereas with the complementary probability it is weak. When the
innovation is weak, there is a significant risk of negative aggregate shocks,
reducing the productivity of all projects in the innovative sector. When the
innovation is strong, the likelihood of such negative shocks is lower. As long
as there is no aggregate shock, confidence in the strength of the innovation
increases. This leads to an increase in the size of the innovative sector. In
contrast, when negative shocks occur, this generates pessimism and leads to a
decline in the size of the innovative sector.2
Our model features managers and investors. The latter can invest in the
traditional sector or the innovative one. Because the traditional sector is
well known, investors can directly manage their investments in that sector.
In contrast, investment in the innovative sector is more challenging. While
managers know how to operate in that sector, investors do not. Hence, when
opting for the innovative sector, investors must delegate the care of their
investments to managers. Thus, investors are principals, while managers are
their agents. Correspondingly, we hereafter take the terms “managers” and
“agents” as synonymous.
Agents managing investments in the innovative sector can exert costly risk
prevention effort, to reduce downward risk. This is in line with investment
situations with bounded upside in which the key is to prevent an unusually low
downside. This applies, in general, to the need for due diligence in the purchase
of assets, whereby failure to inspect an asset may fail to uncover some hidden
flaw. This fits particularly well the purchase of fixed income securities. For
example, when investing in a portfolio of Collateralized debt obligations, or
high-yield bonds, the manager can carefully scrutinize the quality of the paper
in which he invests. Alternatively, if not exerting risk prevention effort, the
manager relies on ready-made evaluations, such as those obtained from credit
rating agencies. We consider a continuum of heterogeneous managers. Some
have efficient risk management systems, so that, for them, risk prevention effort
2 Thus, our analysis is in line with that of Zeira (1987, 1999), Rob (1991), Pastor and Veronesi (2006), and
Barbarino and Jovanovic (2007), who show that learning induces fluctuations in industry size.
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is not very costly. Others have less efficient risk management systems and incur
larger costs when they exert risk prevention effort.
Our key assumption is that the benefits of risk prevention effort materialize
when the innovation is subsequently hit by a negative shock. When there is
no negative shock, innovative projects fare well, even when managers exerted
low effort. When a negative shock hits, the projects whose managers exerted
large risk prevention effort are relatively robust, whereas the other projects
are highly likely to fail. This assumption fits the stylized facts from the Tech
boom and bust. Market participants who invested without careful scrutiny
in dot.com ventures fared relatively well until the bust of March 2000, but
then incurred large losses. Another example is momentum-like trading, where,
instead of conducting fundamental analysis, fund managers invest in stocks
that previously fared well. While such strategy can generate profits in lenient
market environments, it runs the risk of large losses when the market is hit
by a negative shock.3 Similarly, institutions that purchased mortgage-backed
securities based on superficial risk controls and ready-made evaluations, such
as ratings, made large losses only when the crisis hit, in the summer of 2007.
In contrast, those professional investors and investment banks who scrutinized
quality lost much less.
For clarity and simplicity, we first analyze the case in which effort
is observable and contractible. Then we turn to the moral hazard case.
With symmetric information, we obtain the following equilibrium dynamics.
Initially, when confidence is low (that is, for a low probability that the innovative
sector is strong), only managers with efficient risk management systems enter,
and they exert high risk prevention effort. At some point, confidence becomes
so high that entry becomes profitable for managers with less efficient risk
prevention systems, exerting low effort. This accelerates the growth of the
innovative sector, while inducing a decline in risk prevention standards. Thus,
our theoretical analysis yields the following implications.
• After strong cumulated performance, there is an endogenous decline in
risk prevention standards, with the strongest decline occurring precisely
at the time of the sharpest increase in the size of the innovative sector.
• As confidence increases, there is both a decline in the probability of a
negative shock and an increase in the size of the aggregate loss in case
of shock. This is consistent with the empirical findings of Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2012) that busts following long booms are worse than those coming
after short booms.
• When risk prevention standards start declining, there is an increase in the
cross-sectional variance of the probability of default across managers. If
3 Daniel and Moskowitz (2012) find that momentum strategies earn negative returns when markets are particularly
volatile and declining. Similarly, Daniel, Jagannathan, and Kim (2012) find that momentum strategies experience
infrequent but severe losses, when the market is turbulent.
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the growth of the innovative sector continues long enough, however, the
variance of default probabilities across managers eventually declines.
• When the return on standard investments is low and investors search for
yield, the growth of the innovative sector is stronger, but the size of total
losses in case of shock is larger.
• As managers are heterogeneous with respect to the cost of effort, whereas
the marginal manager is indifferent between the two sectors, infra-
marginal managers in the innovative sector earn quasirents, consistent
with the findings of Philippon and Resheff (2008). Furthermore, our
theory implies that the wage differential between the two sectors should
increase with the cumulated performance of the innovative sector.
While the above dynamics arise under symmetric information, in practice
innovative industries are likely to be plagued with incentive problems
and information asymmetries. The techniques used by managers in the
innovative sector are new and difficult to understand for outside investors. The
corresponding opacity makes it difficult for the investors to observe, monitor,
and control the actions of the managers. Therefore, to increase the relevance
of our analysis, we extend it to the case in which information is asymmetric, as
managers’ efforts are unobservable by investors.4 In this richer setting, which
we refer to as moral hazard, we obtain the following additional implications.
• Moral hazard reduces the ability to ensure that managers exert large risk
prevention effort. At the same time, when confidence is low, it is not
profitable to invest in the innovation if the manager is to exert low risk
prevention effort. Thus, when initial confidence is low and incentive
problems are severe, there is no investment in the innovative sector. In a
sense, the innovation is trapped.5
• On the other hand, if confidence is somewhat larger, the innovation
grows faster and the innovative sector is larger with incentive problems
than without. In the first best, initially, only managers with efficient risk
prevention systems enter, and they exert large effort. In contrast, under
moral hazard, it is difficult to screen efficient managers exerting large
effort from less efficient managers exerting low effort. This facilitates
the entry of inefficient managers, exerting low risk prevention effort.
Such entry fuels the growth of the innovative sector, and inflates its size
relative to the first best.
4 We also assume that managers’effort costs are unobservable. Although this does not affect the results when effort
is observable, this plays a key role when effort is not observable.
5 In our analysis, as in the cascade model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) or the multiplayer bandit
of Bolton and Harris (1999), agents do not internalize the positive externalities their own experimentation creates
for others. But what precludes optimal experimentation in the present model is moral hazard, which differs from
that of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) or Bolton and Harris (1999).
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• In this context, the expected compensation of managers exerting low
effort exceeds their productivity. They earn informational rents, at the
expense of the efficient managers exerting large effort.
• This situation is beneficial for the inefficient managers who would not
have been hired in the first best, but it is socially costly, as it increases
the vulnerability of the innovative sector and the aggregate loss in case
of shock.
While our theoretical model could also be applied to nonfinancial
innovations, it is particularly appropriate to describe and analyze the dynamics
of innovations in the finance sector. Three of the most important features
of financial innovations play a key role in our analysis: First, risk control
and management are key to the success of financial innovations, and the
managers of our model are in charge of these activities. Second, the complexity
and nonphysical nature of financial innovations make it difficult for outside
investors to observe finance sector managers actions, generating moral hazard,
as in our model. Third, when financial innovations prove to be weak, this
generates severe losses for a large cross-section of financial institutions, again
as in our model.
Our theoretical analysis shows that, with imperfect markets, the equilibrium
size of the financial sector can exceed its first-best counterpart, as in Bolton,
Santos, and Scheinkman (2013) and Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2013). Yet,
our analysis and theirs involve markedly different economic mechanisms. In
our paper it is the entry of managers exerting low risk prevention effort that
inflates the financial sector, while in Bolton, Santos, and Scheinkman (2013)
it is the fact that dealer’s entry in the opaque OTC market worsens adverse
selection in the transparent market, and, in Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill (2013),
entry is excessive because of congestion externalities.
Our model involves learning, as in Diamond’s (1991), Noe and Rebello
(Forthcoming), Persons and Warther (1997), and Berk and Green (2004).Again,
our analysis involves very different economic mechanisms, and generates
qualitatively different results. In particular, Diamond’s (1991) result that agents
are less likely to be of the risky type after good performance contrasts with our
result that risk prevention standards decline after good performance. Similarly,
while in Noe and Rebello (Forthcoming) the incentives of the agent improve
as the firm is perceived to be less vulnerable, in our model it is the opposite.
Also, while in Persons and Warther (1997) there is positive skewness in the
distribution of outcomes across innovations, so that most innovations perform
worse than expected, in our analysis, there is negative skewness: after good
performance, managers switch to low risk prevention, creating the risk of
unlikely but large aggregate losses. Finally, in Berk and Green (2004), learning
about the skills of an individual manager drives the amount of funds this
manager is entrusted with. In contrast, we model learning about the industry,
driving the aggregate amount of funds delegated to managers. In this context,
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unlike in that of Berk and Green (2004), aggregate industry risk varies reflecting
i) the likelihood that the industry is strong and ii) the aggregate level of risk
prevention effort.
1. The Model
1.1 Agents and goods
Consider an infinite horizon economy, operating in discrete time at periods t =
1,2,....At each period, there is a mass-one continuum of competitive managers,
indexed by i∈ [0,1], and a mass-one continuum of investors.All are risk neutral
and have limited liability. In the basic version of our model, with symmetric
information, equilibrium is the same regardless of whether agents live one
period or many. When we turn to the moral hazard case (in Section 4), to
simplify the contracting problem we assume market participants live only one
period, and, at the beginning of each period, a new generation is born.6
At the beginning of each period, each investor is endowed with one unit of
investment good, while managers have no initial endowment. Investors can
invest their initial endowment themselves, an option we hereafter refer to as
“self-investment.” The rate of return on self-investment is denoted by r , that is,
1 unit of investment good yields 1+r units of consumption good. Alternatively,
each investor can decide to delegate the management of her investment good
to a manager operating in the innovative sector. Each manager can handle only
one unit of investment. This is the simplest way to model decreasing returns
to scale, in the same spirit as Berk and Green (2004). Managers that are not in
charge of investments remain in their initial occupation, with opportunity wage
normalized to zero. At the end of each period, all market participants consume
their share of the consumption good.
1.2 Uncertainty and learning
When a new technology is discovered, its quality is initially untested. Before
agents have been able to experiment with it, they are uncertain of how it will
fare in various circumstances. Correspondingly, agents must learn about the
strengths and weaknesses of the innovation. We consider the case in which the
innovation can be weak or strong and model learning as follows.
Each period, the innovative sector can fare well, which is denoted by ξ =0.
Alternatively, it can be hit by a negative aggregate shock (denoted by ξ =1),
reducing the expected productivity of all innovative projects.7 Initially the
likelihood of shocks is uncertain, but all market participants know that the
6 Dynamic contracting under moral hazard and learning can generate rich but complex phenomena. In particular,
unobserved shirking can create a wedge between the beliefs of principals and agents. Bergemann and Hege
(1998, 2005) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2008) offer insightful analyses of this problem.
7 Hereafter, for brevity, we sometimes omit the qualifier “negative,” but when we simply write “shock,” we always
refer to a negative shock.
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innovation can be strong or weak and that strong innovations are less prone
to negative shocks than are fragile ones. More precisely, when the innovation
is strong, the probability of a negative shock is 1−p¯. When it is fragile this
probability is 1−p>1− p¯.
Throughout the paper, we assume the occurrence of shocks is observable
and contractible. Hence, market participants use past realizations to conduct
Bayesian learning about the strength of the innovation. At the beginning of the
first period (t =1), they start with the prior probability π1 that the innovation
is strong. For t >1, denote by πt the updated probability that the innovation is
strong, given the returns realized in the innovative sector at times {1,...,t−1}.
When there is no shock, the probability that the innovation is strong is revised
upward to
p¯πt
p¯πt +p(1−πt ) >πt . (1)
If there is a negative shock, the probability that the innovation is strong is
revised downward to
(1−p¯)πt
(1−p¯)πt +(1−p)(1−πt ) <πt .
Thus, p¯>p is a key assumption in our model. It implies that weak innovations
are more exposed to negative shocks than strong ones, and consequently that
when shocks are rare the innovation is likely to be strong. At each point in time
t , the problem faced by all market participants is the same as at t−1, except
for the difference in the probability that the innovation is strong. The dynamics
of the probability (πt ) that the innovation is strong is one-to-one with that of
the updated probability of a negative shock
θt =1−(πt p¯+(1−πt )p). (2)
We hereafter use θt as the state variable. When the innovation is known for sure
to be weak, that is, πt =0, then θt =1−p. When the innovation is known for
sure to be strong, that is, πt =1, then θt =1−p¯.
1.3 Effort, output, and costs
Each agent i can exert high effort (ei = e¯) or low effort (ei =e). For simplicity,
we normalize e¯ to 1. If there is no shock, for all projects the realization of
the output variable ˜Y is Y >1+r with probability 1, regardless of effort. If
there is a negative shock, with probability μ+(1−ei) 1−e , a project fails and
the realization of ˜Y is zero. With the complementary probability, the project
is successful and the realization of ˜Y is Y . High managerial effort leads to an
improvement in the distribution of output in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance. We interpret this in terms of risk prevention. For example, in a
financial context, fund managers and bankers can spend effort and resources on
risk analysis. Such high effort enables them to screen investment opportunities
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Innovation Default probability
is strong
θ = 1 0No shockp
πt
μ + (1-e)ΔShock1- p
Invest
1− πt p 0No shock
Innovation μ + (1-e)ΔShock1- p
is weak
θ = 0
Figure 1
The structure of uncertainty in period t
and avoid those with a large failure risk. In contrast, ei =e corresponds to
weak risk management practices such as, e.g, exclusive reliance on external
credit rating agencies, backward-looking measures of risk or failure to conduct
adequate stress tests as discussed by Ellul and Yerramilli (2010). Such lack of
fundamental valuation and risk analysis exposes investments to larger downside
risk in case of negative shocks.
While managers all have access to the same type of investment project,
they are heterogeneous with respect to the efficiency of their risk management
systems. When exerting effort ei , manager i incurs nonmonetary cost eiCi . Ci
is distributed over [0,Cmax] with cdf F . Managers with high Cs have inefficient
risk control systems, making it difficult and costly for them to screen out bad
investment projects.
It is very difficult for outside investors to observe and monitor the efficiency
of financial firms’ risk management systems. In fact, it is even difficult for
supervisors, who are explicitly in charge of such monitoring, and assign teams
of highly competent examiners to conduct this task.8 To reflect this difficulty,
we assume, throughout the paper, that costs (Ci) are unobservable by investors.
When effort is observable, private information on Ci does not affect equilibrium
outcomes, because returns, for a given level of effort, are unaffected by C. In
contrast, when effort is not observable, asymmetric information on Ci affects
equilibrium outcomes, as analysed below, in Section 4.
The unfolding of uncertainty in each period t is illustrated in Figure 1. As
can be seen in the figure, when the manager exerts high effort, the project can
8 For example, one can read in the OCC’s Handbook on Large Bank Supervision (2010, 2,3) that “...the OCC
assigns examiners to work full-time at the largest institutions... The OCC’s large bank supervision objectives
are designed to...[e]valuate the overall integrity and effectiveness of risk management systems, using periodic
validation through transaction testing...examiners...attempt to...determine whether...bank systems and processes
permit management to adequately identify, measure, monitor, and control existing and prospective levels of risk.”
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fail only with probability μθt . Thus, expected surplus (gross of the managerial
cost of effort and the outside opportunity wage) is
αt =(1−μθt )Y −(1+r). (3)
The larger the probability, θt , that there is a negative shock, the lower the
expected surplus αt . We assume however (to limit the number of cases), that,
even when the innovation is known for sure to be fragile, αt ≥0, that is
1−p≤ 1
μ
Y −(1+r)
Y
. (4)
When the manager exerts low effort, on the other hand, the gross expected
surplus is
αt −θtY. (5)
The larger the probability of a shock, the higher the value of risk prevention,
θtY . Thus, because αt is decreasing in θt , αt −θtY , the expected surplus
under low effort, is also decreasing in θt . Finally, we assume that
Cmax >max[(1−μ(1−p¯))Y −(1+r), (1−μ(1−p¯))Y −(1−p¯)Y −(1+r)1−e ]
(6)
so that, even when the innovation is known for sure to be strong, it is
suboptimal to hire the least efficient manager. This implies that the mass of
managers who could operate efficiently in the innovative sector is lower than
the mass of investors, which can be interpreted in terms of scarcity of managers.
Assumption (6) is made for simplicity. Our qualitative results would still obtain
under weaker assumptions.
Throughout the paper, we assume output realizations are observable and
contractible. Within each period t , the sequence of actions is the following:
• investors and managers start with the same belief πt that the innovation
is strong,
• investors and managers meet in the labor market,
• managers who have been hired exert high or low effort.
• there is a negative shock or not, and this is observable by all market
participants,
• for each project, the investment is successful and yields Y or fails and
yields zero.
2. Dynamics of Innovative Activities when Effort Is Observable
In this section we consider the case in which efforts (ei) are observable and
contractible, so that there are no incentive problems.
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2.1 Equilibrium
Investors and managers meet in the labor market. There are two submarkets: one
for managers exerting high effort, the other for managers exerting low effort.
A compensation contract is a mapping of all the observable variables into the
compensation of a manager. In the present section, the observable variables
in period t are the state variable θt , the output of the project ˜Y , whether a
shock occurred or not ξt , and the effort of the manager. In the observable effort
case, the only thing that matters, both for the investor and the manager, is the
expected compensation of the manager for a given θt and effort.9
We denote by m¯ the compensation contract for managers hired to exert high
effort, and by m the contract for low effort. For simplicity, we assume market
participants are competitive. Thus, they take the equilibrium contracts as given.
The equilibrium condition is that labor supply equals labor demand. Labor
supply in a given submarket is the mass of managers who (weakly) prefer to
be hired in that submarket rather than to not be hired or operate in the other
submarket. Labor demand is the mass of investors who (weakly) prefer to invest
in this market rather than to self-invest or operate in the other market.
Market clearing implies
E[m¯|e¯,θt ]=αt ,E[m|e,θt ]=max[αt −θtY,0]. (7)
When αt −θtY ≥0, (7) means that investors are indifferent between self-
investment, investment with high effort, and investment with low effort.
When αt −θtY <0, it means investors are indifferent between self-investment
and investment with high effort. To see why (7) is necessary for market
clearing, consider the case in which αt −θtY <0. In this case suppose we
had E[m¯|e¯,θt ]<αt . Then all investors would prefer to hire managers to exert
high effort, that is, labor demand in the market for managers exerting high
effort would be equal to one. Yet, labor supply could not exceed F (E[m¯|e¯,θt ]),
which is the mass of managers with cost of effort Ci <E[m¯|e¯,θt ]. Because this
mass is strictly lower than one (because of (6)), the market would not clear.
Thus, when αt −θtY <0, market clearing entails E[m¯|e¯,θt ]=αt as illustrated
in Figure 2. Similar arguments apply for the other cases.
(7) implies that, whenever an investor hires a manager, the latter captures all
the surplus generated by their interaction. This is in line with Berk and Green
(2004), where the economic rents flow through to the managers who create
them, not to the investors who invest in them. Our result reflects the assumption
that managers are heterogeneous, and, while the best of them are very good, the
worst ones are quite inefficient, as stated in (6). Thus, highly talented managers
are scarce. And this matters because each manager can handle only one project
and managers have different Cs.
9 In the next section, we consider the unobservable effort case, in which the precise mapping between observable
variables and compensation matters, because it affects incentives.
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Demand for 
managers 
1
exerting large
effort
F(E(m|e θ ))
Supply of 
, t
managers 
exerting large 
α E(m|e,θt )
effort
t
Figure 2
Market clearing when αt <θY
Manager i applies for a job requesting high effort if
E[m¯|e¯,θt ]−Ci ≥max[0,E[m|e,θt ]−eCi], (8)
whereas she applies for a job requesting low effort if
E[m|e,θt ]−eCi ≥max[0,E[m¯|e¯,θt ]−Ci]. (9)
Otherwise, she chooses to remain in her initial occupation. Hence manager
i choosing between high effort, low effort, and staying out of the innovative
sector obtains the following expected gain
max[E[m¯|e¯,θt ]−Ci,E[m|e,θt ]−eCi,0]. (10)
Substituting (7) into (10 ), the expected gain obtained by manager i in the
innovative sector is
max[αt −Ci,αt −θtY −eCi,0]. (11)
Because (11) is also equal to the social value created by the employment of
manager i in the innovative sector, we have that market equilibrium is Pareto
optimal. It is natural, because the market is competitive and frictionless, that
the first welfare theorem holds.
Denoting
βt =
θtY
1−e , γt =
αt −θtY
e
,
(7), (8), and (9) imply that managers choosing high effort are such that,
Ci ≤min[αt ,βt ], (12)
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Figure 3
Equilibrium dynamics without incentive problems
α is the expected surplus generated with large effort (gross of the cost of effort). β is the threshold value of
C, below which large effort is preferred to low effort. γ is the threshold value of C, below which delegated
investment with low effort is more valuable than self-investment. When Ci ≤min[α,β], there is large effort.
When β<Ci <γ , there is low effort.
whereas managers choosing low effort are such that10
βt ≤Ci ≤γt . (13)
If Ci =αt , agent i is indifferent between effort and staying out of the innovative
sector. If Ci =βt , agent i is indifferent between effort and no effort. If Ci =γt ,
agent i is indifferent between low effort and staying out of the innovative
sector. Thus, when Ci =αt =βt , we have Ci =γt . Define θˆ as the probability of
a negative shock such that βt =γt =αt . Simple computations yield
θˆ =
Y −(1+r)
Y
1
μ+ 1−e
. (14)
To focus on the interesting case, we assume that θˆ is in the support of θ , that
is, 1−p¯<θˆ <1−p.
βt increases linearly in θt , whereas γt and αt decrease linearly. These
functions are as illustrated in Figure 3. Inspecting the figure and using conditions
(12) and (13), one sees that, for θt >θˆ , managers with Ci ≤αt choose to
be employed to exert high effort, whereas managers with Ci >αt prefer to
stay out of the innovative sector. For θt ≤ θˆ , managers with Ci ≤βt choose
to be employed to exert high effort, managers with βt ≤Ci ≤γt choose to be
employed to exert low effort, and managers with Ci >γt prefer to stay out of
10 Note that, as can be seen in Figure 3, when αt <βt , the interval [βt ,γt ] does not exist.
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the innovative sector. Thus, noting that θt declines as long as the industry is not
hit by a negative shock, we can state our first proposition.
Proposition 1. When θt ≥ θˆ , all agents hired to manage investment exert high
effort, and their expected compensation, E[m¯|e¯,θt ]=αt as well as their mass,
F (αt ), grow as long as the industry is not hit by a shock.
When θt <θˆ , while a mass F (βt ) of agents exert high effort, a mass F (γt )−
F (βt ) exert low effort. The former earn expected compensation, E[m¯|e¯,θt ]=αt ,
the latter earn E[m|e,θt ]=αt −θtY . Both expected compensations, and also
the mass of managers in the innovative industry, grow as as long as the industry
is not hit by a shock.
When there is a negative shock, compensation and the number of managers
working in the innovative industry suddenly drop.
Managers who are more efficient at controlling risks (with low Ci) are more
likely to be employed in jobs requesting high effort. They correspondingly earn
larger compensation. Once confidence has improved so much that θt becomes
lower than θˆ , the increase in the fraction of managers exerting low effort tends
to push average compensation down. But, controlling for the type of tasks (that
is, high or low effort), compensation continues to grow as long as the innovation
is successful.
2.2 Inframarginal rents
Inframarginal managers’rents are equal to the difference between their expected
compensation and their cost of effort. Thus, manager i obtains rent equal to
R(Ci,θt )=max[αt −Ci,αt −θtY −eCi,0]. (15)
By construction, except for the marginal agent, managers employed in the
innovative sector earn strictly positive rents, reflecting the above-mentioned
scarcity of highly talented managers. Thus, we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The expected compensation of managers employed in the
innovative sector exceeds the sum of their cost of effort and their outside
opportunity wage. The corresponding infra-marginal rents (R(Ci,θt )) increase,
for all managers, as confidence in the strength of the innovative sector increases.
The quasirents in Corollary 1 reflect managers’ heterogeneity, similarly to
Berk and Green (2004).
2.3 Implications of the model with observable effort
2.3.1 Growth and compensation in the innovative sector. As long as there is
no negative shock, confidence in the innovation increases, that is, θt decreases.
Proposition 1 implies that this leads to an increase in the mass of agents hired to
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manage investments. When θt gets lower than θˆ , the innovation is perceived to
be so strong that, even with low effort, it can outperform self-investment. This
spurs the entry of relatively inefficient managers, who are planning to exert
low effort. This, in turn, can induce an increase in the growth of the innovative
sector. As long as θt >θˆ , the size of the innovative sector is F (αt ). Thus, the
growth of the innovative sector is given by
dF (αt )
dt
=
dF (αt )
dθt
dθt
dt
=f (αt )dαt
dθt
dθt
dt
=−f (αt )μY dθt
dt
=f (αt )μY |dθt
dt
|.
As soon as θt <θˆ , the size of the innovative sector is F (γt ). Thus, the growth
of the innovative sector is given by
dF (γt )
dt
=
dF (γt )
dθt
dθt
dt
=f (γt )dγt
dθt
dθt
dt
=−f (γt ) (μ+)Y
e
dθt
dt
=f (γt ) (μ+)Y
e
|dθt
dt
|.
Noting that e<e¯=1 and that, at θt = θˆ , f (αt )=f (γt ), we have that the growth
of the finance sector just before θˆ : dF (αt )
dt
, is lower than its counterpart just after
θˆ : dF (γt )
dt
. Otherwise stated, the growth of the innovative sector induced by the
absence of shock increases when θt hits θˆ . Graphically, this corresponds to the
fact that, in Figure 3, the absolute value of the slope of γt is larger than that of
the slope of αt .
Thus, noting that confidence increases with the time without negative shocks
and also with the cumulated performance of the innovative sector, which can
be empirically measured by cumulated operating profits, we can state our first
implication.
Implication 1. The size of the innovative sector is increasing in the length
of the period without negative shock and the cumulative performance of the
innovation. After sustained performance, there is an increase in the growth of
the innovative sector.
Because Corollary 1 implies that expected compensation increases with the
confidence in the innovation, we can state the following implication.
Implication 2. The longer the period without negative shock and the larger the
cumulative performance of the innovation, the higher the wage in the innovative
sector.
Our theoretical result that compensation in the innovative sector trends
upwards is in line with the empirical findings of Philippon and Resheff (2008).
2.3.2 Deteriorating standards in the innovative sector. When θt >θˆ , all
managers exert high effort, and after sustained success θt becomes lower than
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θˆ , and an increasing fraction of managers are hired without being requested to
exert high effort. Correspondingly, when θt gets below θˆ , there is a decline in the
proportion of managers exerting large risk prevention effort. More precisely,
when θt <θˆ the average effort level is
F (βt )+ F (γt )−F (βt )
F (γt )
e=e+(1−e)F (βt )
F (γt )
,
which is increasing in θt , because F (βt ) is increasing in θt , while F (γt ) is
decreasing. Thus, as confidence increases (and θt goes down), there is a decline
in the average level of effort requested, coinciding with a decline in the average
efficiency of risk management systems. Interpreting this as a decline in risk
prevention standards, we obtain the following implication.
Implication 3. After sustained success, there is a decline in risk prevention
standards, starting at the time at which the growth of the innovative sector
accelerates.
Implication 3 is consistent with the empirical findings of Dell’Ariccia, Igan
and Laeven (2008) who write in their abstract: “This paper links the current
sub-prime mortgage crisis to a decline in lending standards associated with the
rapid expansion of this market.” Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008) relate
their empirical findings to asymmetric information-based theories of financial
accelerators (see Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). Yet,
our analysis shows that agency problems are not needed to rationalize these
findings.11 The decline in standards in implication 3 corresponds to the entry
of financial intermediaries with weaker and weaker risk control systems. To
test this implication, empirical proxies for the strength of risk control systems
are needed. One could rely on the Risk Management Index developed by Ellul
and Yerramilli (2010).12
2.3.3 Unlikely but large aggregate losses. The probability of a negative
shock (θt ) decreases with the number of periods without a shock. For θt ≥ θˆ ,
the mass of failing projects in case of a negative shock is
F (αt )μ.
This decreases with θt , that is, it increases with the confidence in the innovation,
simply because, as confidence grows, more projects are operated in the
11 In the next section, however, we show that these problems are exacerbated by information asymmetry.
12 Consistent with our theoretical analysis, Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) find that financial institutions with stronger
risk control systems in 2006 had lower exposure to private–label mortgage–backed securities, had a smaller
fraction of nonperforming loans, and had lower downside risk during the crisis years.
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innovative sector. When θt <θˆ , the mass of failures in case of negative shock
becomes
F (αt )μ+[F (γt )−F (αt )]μ+[F (γt )−F (βt )],
which is also decreasing in θt . This reflects two evolutions: First, as above,
as confidence increases, the number of projects operated in the innovative
sector increases. Second, as confidence increases, an increasing fraction of the
projects is operated with low risk prevention effort. Thus, we can state the next
implication.
Implication 4. As the probability of a shock (θt ) declines, the size of the loss
in case of shocks increases. After a sustained period of success, when θt gets
lower than θˆ , there is an increase in the growth of the innovative sector and the
mass of failures in case of shock.
Our theoretical analysis thus implies that long-awaited shocks, that come
after a period of sustained performance and growing confidence, are more
severe than shocks happening during the early developments of the innovation.
This is in line with the empirical finding by Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) that busts
following long booms are worse than busts coming after short booms. The
pattern generated by our model could look like a bubble followed by a crash.
Yet it simply reflects how the optimal level of investment and effort adjusts as
agents learn about the strength of the innovation.
2.3.4 The cross-section of failure probabilities. For θt ≥ θˆ , the failure
probability for each project operated in the innovative sector is θtμ. For θt <θˆ ,
the failure probability in the innovative sector remains equal to θtμ for projects
with Ci ≤βt , but it is θt (μ+) for projects with Ci >βt . Thus, for θt <θˆ , the
cross-sectional average default rate in the innovative sector is
θt {F (βt )
F (γt )
μ+
F (γt )−F (βt )
F (γt )
(μ+)}=θt {μ+(1− F (βt )
F (γt )
)}.
This is the product of the probability of shock (θt ) by the cross-sectional average
probability of default in case of shock. The latter increases with the confidence
in the innovative sector.
While for θt ≥ θˆ , all managers operating in the innovative sector have the
same probability of default: θt, for θt <θˆ , a fraction F (βt )/F (γt ) of the
managers have default rate in case of shock equal to μ, while for the others it
is μ+. Hence, for θt ≥ θˆ , the cross-sectional variance of default probabilities
in case of shock is zero, while, for lower values of θt , it is
2
F (βt )
F (γt )
(1− F (βt )
F (γt )
)2.
As θt crosses θˆ , F (βt )F (γt ) is initially close to one. Then it decreases with further
increases in confidence. Correspondingly, the cross-sectional variance of
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default probabilities in case of shock is initially very small, but increases as
confidence builds up. On the other hand, if θt decreases enough for F (βt )F (γt ) to
reach one-half, then further increases in confidence reduce this cross-sectional
variance. The intuition is the following. As long as θt >θˆ , all managers exert
high effort, so that there is no cross-sectional variation in the probability of
default in case of shock. When θt crosses θˆ from above, an initially small but
gradually increasing fraction of managers exerts low effort. Correspondingly,
for values of θt below θˆ , but not too far from it, heterogeneity in effort exertion
across managers increases with confidence. But, for very low values of θt , the
majority of managers exert low effort, and further decreases in θt increase
this majority, thereby reducing the heterogeneity in default probabilities.
Correspondingly, the cross-sectional variance of default probabilities across
managers is inverse-U shaped in θt . Our next implication summarizes this
discussion:
Implication 5. As confidence in the innovation improves, the average default
rate in case of shock increases, while the cross-sectional variance of default
rates first increases and then decreases.
To test implication 5, one needs empirical proxies for failure probabilities.
One could rely on put options with different strikes, on credit risk implied by
interest rates, or on credit default swap prices, for the market as well as for
individual names.
2.3.5 Search for yield and the dynamics of the innovative sector. When r
is low, the return on self-investment is low, leading investors to search for yield.
Other things equal, a decrease in r raises αt and θˆ . This accelerates the entry
of managers exerting low effort, and the growth of the innovative industry, but
also increases the size of total losses in case of negative shock. This is stated
in our next implication.
Implication 6. The lower r , the more investors search for yield, the larger the
size of the innovative sector, and the larger the size of total losses in case of
shock.
3. Dynamics of Innovative Activities under Moral Hazard
The equilibrium analyzed above corresponds to the perfect market case.
In practice, however, innovative industries are likely to be plagued with
information asymmetries. To shed light on the consequences of these problems,
we now turn to the case in which efforts (ei) are unobservable by investors.13
We hereafter refer to this situation as moral hazard.
13 Our modeling of the unobservability of effort is similar to that of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In our model,
however, unlike that of Holmstrom and Tirole, i) the consequences of the level of effort depend on whether or
not there is an aggregate shock or not, and ii) the cost of effort is not observable by investors.
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While in the first-best it was sufficient to consider the expected compensation
of managers, under moral hazard, the precise mapping from observable
outcomes to transfers must now be specified. Because of limited liability of
investors, when the realization of ˜Y is zero the compensation of the manager
is also zero. Hence, we need only consider four transfers: m¯(ξ =0) when the
agent who is requested to exert high effort is successful and there is no shock,
m¯(ξ =1) when the agent who is requested to exert high effort is successful in
spite of a shock, and m(ξ =0) and m(ξ =1) for the corresponding outcomes
when the agent is requested to exert low effort.
3.1 Equilibrium
When confidence in the innovation is strong enough, the expected surplus
is so large that the first-best allocation is incentive compatible, in spite of
the unobservability of effort. To show this, we exhibit a contract, m (offered
to managers exerting high effort as well as to those exerting low effort) that
implements the first best allocation and is incentive compatible when θt is large
enough. This contract is such that m(ξ =1)=Y . Because managers receive all
the output in case of shock (which is the only case where effort matters), it is in
their own interest to choose the first-best level of effort. Consider, for example,
the incentive compatibility condition for high effort:
E[m|e¯,θt ]−Ci ≥E[m|e,θt ]−eCi, (16)
that is
C≤ θm(ξ =1)
1−e . (17)
With m(ξ =1)=Y , (17) simplifies to
θtY
1−e ≥Ci,
which is the condition under which, in the first best, a manager entering the
innovative sector prefers to exert high effort rather than low effort. Furthermore,
given that m(ξ =1)=Y , investors break even if and only if
(1−θt )[Y −m(ξ =0)]=1+r.
This is compatible with the limited-liability constraint that m(ξ =0)≥0 if and
only if
θt ≤ Y −(1+r)
Y
.
Finally, because investors just break even and managers exert the efficient level
of effort, managers obtain the entire surplus when they enter the innovative
sector. Consequently, it is in their own interest to make the entry decisions that
are first-best optimal. Thus, we can state the following proposition:
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Proposition 2. When θt ≤ Y−(1+r)Y , equilibrium is the same with or without
moral hazard.
Hereafter, we restrict attention to the more interesting case in which moral
hazard matters, that is, we focus on values of θt above Y−(1+r)Y . An important
feature of equilibrium dynamics in the first-best is the switch from the
equilibrium regime in which all managers exert effort (arising for θt ≥ θˆ ), to
that in which some exert low effort. Because the choice of effort level is the
key decision in our moral hazard model, it is important to consider the values
of θt for which the switch from high to low effort can occur. Because we focus
on θt >
Y−(1+r)
Y
, this requires that θˆ > Y−(1+r)
Y
. This inequality is equivalent to
1−e> 
1−μ, (18)
which we assume hereafter. The interpretation of (18) is the following: The
left-hand side is the additional amount of effort needed to exert large risk
prevention. The right-hand side is the relative increase in risk avoided by
exerting high effort. Condition (18) states that the cost of switching to high
effort (proportional to left-hand side) is relatively large compared to the benefit
(proportional to the right-hand-side). In that case, the switch from high to low
effort occurs relatively early. That is, θˆ is relatively large, larger than Y−(1+r)
Y
.
We now establish, that when θt > Y−(1+r)Y , under moral hazard, two distinct
contracts cannot be offered in equilibrium. Suppose by contradiction that two
distinct contracts are offered, one inducing high effort, the other low effort.14 As
in the first-best (see Equation (7)), market clearing and the scarcity of managers
imply that investors must exactly break even on each contract. Hence, the
expected pay-offs, and the decisions of managers (high effort, low effort, no
participation) must be exactly the same as in proposition 1. Now, proposition 1
implies that there are two active contracts only when θt <θˆ , and that contract
m¯ (compensating high effort) is chosen by all managers such that
Ci ≤βt = θtY1−e . (19)
Similarly to (17), the incentive compatibility condition is
Ci ≤ θtm¯(ξ =1)1−e (20)
for all the managers i choosing contract m¯. For the marginal manager (19)
holds as an equality and (20) can hold only if m¯(ξ =1)=Y . As shown above,
14 We show in the Appendix that one can also rule out situations in which i) one of the two contracts would attract
both managers exerting high effort and managers exerting low effort, or ii) the two contracts would attract
managers exerting high effort and managers exerting low effort.
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in the proof of proposition 2, m¯(ξ =1)=Y is compatible with limited liability
only when θt ≤ Y−(1+r)Y , which is ruled out by construction. This shows, by
contradiction, that there is always at most one active contract at equilibrium.
Hence, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Under moral hazard, when (18) holds and θt > Y−(1+r)Y , at most
one contract is offered at equilibrium.
Our third, striking, result is that, contrarily to the case in which effort is
observable, moral hazard implies that there is always a positive fraction of
active managers that exert low effort at equilibrium. Again, the proof proceeds
by contradiction. Suppose all active managers would exert high effort. Then
equilibrium would involves a unique contract, m. m should be such that
investors would at least break even, that is,
(1−θt )m(ξ =0)+θt (1−μ)m(ξ =1)≤ (1−θtμ))Y −(1+r)≡αt . (21)
Because manager’s limited liability implies m(ξ =0)≥0, (21) implies
m(ξ =1)≤ αt
θt (1−μ) .
Consequently,
θtm(ξ =1)≤ αt(1−μ) <αt (1−e),
where the second inequality stems from (18). Thus, the marginal manager, with
cost of effort Ci =αt , would strictly prefer to exert low effort, which establishes
the contradiction. We can thus state the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under moral hazard, when (18) holds and θt > Y−(1+r)Y , there is
always a positive fraction of active managers that exert low effort at equilibrium.
We now characterize the equilibrium arising in that case. We know that it
must be a pooling equilibrium, in which only one contract, m, is offered and
some of the managers accepting it exert high effort, while others exert low
effort. Denoting
C =
θtm(ξ =1)
1−e , (22)
and
C¯ =
(1−θt )m(ξ =0)+θt (1−μ−)m(ξ =1)
e
, (23)
the managers who prefer high effort than low effort are those with Ci ≤C, while
those who prefer to be hired and exert low effort are such that C≤Ci ≤ C¯.
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The market clearing condition, requiring that investors earn zero profit, is
(1−θt )m(ξ =0)+θt (1−μ−x)m(ξ =1)=(1−θt (μ+x))Y −(1+r), (24)
where x is the fraction of the managers hired in the innovative sector who exert
low effort, that is,
x =1− F (C)
F (C¯) =1−
F ( θtm(ξ=1)1−e )
F ( (1−θt )m(ξ=0)+θt (1−μ−)m(ξ=1)
e
)
.
Acontract such that m(ξ =0)>0 cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed an investor
could undercut this contract by offering another one with a lower m(ξ =0) and a
larger m(ξ =1), in such a way that the expected gain for a manager exerting low
effort would be the same (leaving C unchanged) while increasing the gain from
high effort (thus raising C¯).15 This would attract exactly the same managers,
but a higher fraction of them would make an effort, thus generating positive
expected gains for the investors. Hence, in equilibrium, we must have
m(ξ =0)=0. (25)
Thus, x rewrites as
x =1−
F ( θtm(ξ=1)1−e )
F ( θt (1−μ−)m(ξ=1)
e
)
.
For simplicity, we hereafter assume costs are uniformly distributed over
[0,Cmax].16 Then the fraction of managers exerting low effort simplifies to
x =1− e
1−e

1−μ−. (26)
The condition under which m(ξ =1) is nonnegative is
[1−θt (μ+x)]Y −(1+r)≥0, (27)
which simplifies to
θt ≤ 1
μ+x
Y −(1+r)
Y
, (28)
If (28) does not hold, there is a market breakdown and no manager is hired in
the innovative sector. Otherwise, m(ξ =1) is nonnegative and is obtained by
15 It is indeed possible to increase m(ξ =1) because it is less than Y . To see this, consider the market clearing
condition, which implies, when m(ξ =0)>0, that m(ξ =1)< [(1−θt (μ+x))Y −(1+r))](θt (1−μ−x))−1,
which is decreasing in θt . Now, proposition 4 assumes θt > (Y −(1+r))/Y , thus m(ξ =1) is lower than
[Y −(μ+x)(Y −(1+r))−(1+r)]((1−μ−x) Y−(1+r)
Y
)−1 which simplifies to Y .
16 The result that x is a constant obtains whenever f (m), which can be interpreted as labor supply, has constant
elasticity. More generally, if elasticity is nondecreasing, the equilibrium is unique and exhibits the additional
property that x increases with the confidence in the innovation.
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Figure 4
Equilibrium under moral hazard when /(1−μ)<1−e
α, β, and γ are as in Figure 3. For θ ≥ (Y −(1+r)/Y , when Ci ≤C, there is large effort. When C<Ci <C, there
is low effort. For θ < (Y–(1+r)/Y , when Ci ≤β, there is large effort, and when β<Ci <γ , there is low effort.
substituting m(ξ =0)=0 and (26) into (24)
m(ξ =1)= (1−θt (μ+x))Y −(1+r)
θt (1−μ−x) . (29)
Substituting (26), (25), and (29) into (23), we have
C¯ =
1−μ−
1−μ−
[
1− e1−e 1−μ−
] (1−θt (μ+x))Y −(1+r)
e
, (30)
which is linear and decreasing in θt . The above analysis leads to our next
proposition, illustrated in Figure 4.
Proposition 5. Under moral hazard, when (18) hold and costs are uniformly
distributed over [0,Cmax], equilibrium is as follows.
When
θt >
1
μ+x
Y −(1+r)
Y
, (31)
no manager is hired in the innovative sector.
When
1
μ+x
Y −(1+r)
Y
≥θt > Y −(1+r)
Y
,
there exists a pooling equilibrium, in which only one contract m is offered,
a fraction x of the managers working in the innovative sector exerts low
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effort, and the complementary fraction exerts high effort. The average expected
compensation of managers is given by the left-hand side of ( 27), which
increases as confidence in the innovative sector improves.
The intuition underlying the proposition is the following:
When the risk of a negative shock is so high that (31) holds, incentive
problems generate an “innovation trap.” If effort was observable, it would be
feasible to request high effort from all managers. This would enable investment
to take place, which would, in turn, generate learning about the strength of the
innovation. Because of moral hazard however, when the risk of a negative shock
is high it is impossible to ensure that all managers exert high-effort, therefore
investment in the innovative sector is not profitable. So the innovation cannot
develop, and learning cannot take place.
When θt is intermediate, while in the first-best managers exerting low effort
and managers exerting high effort would choose different contracts, under
asymmetric information such sorting is not incentive compatible. Hence, there
is pooling. In line with the argument that led to proposition 3, this pooling
equilibrium cannot be undercut by raising managers’ success payments and
reducing their failure payments so as to attract only good managers (the
traditional cream-skimming argument) because failure payments are zero and
negative payments are precluded by managers’ limited liability.
3.2 Implications of incentive constraints
The next implication summarizes how moral hazard affects the development
of innovations. In line with the above analysis, we focus on the case in which
θt is large and (18) holds. The first part of proposition 5 implies that when
initial confidence is very low, as θ0 > 1μ+x
Y−(1+r)
Y
, and (18) holds, moral hazard
precludes the development of innovations that would have occurred in the first
best. This yields the following implication.
Implication 7. When θ0 > 1μ+x
Y−(1+r)
Y
a decline in the rate of return on
standard investments (r) can trigger a wave of innovations.
When r declines, the threshold level above which innovations are trapped
goes up. Hence, innovations that had become available but had not been able to
develop can suddenly get implemented. Thus, there is a wave of innovations.
Now turn to the second part of proposition 4 and its illustration in Figure 4.
Comparing the slopes of the lines in Figure 4, and reasoning as for implication 1,
we see that when effort is unobservable and θ ∈ [θˆ , Y−(1+r)(μ+x)Y ], the rate of growth
of the innovative sector is larger than in the first best. This reflects that many
managers enter and exert low effort, in contrast with the first best where only
efficient managers, exerting high effort, would enter.
That moral hazard spurs the entry of inefficient managers can lead to a
situation in which the size of the innovative sector is larger than in the first
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best.17 To see how this obtains, consider Figure 4. Managers that are hired and
exert low effort are those with Ci in [C,C¯]. As illustrated in Figure 4, the C¯ line
intersects the horizontal axis at θt = 1μ+x
Y−(1+r)
Y
, which is larger than the point
at which γt intersects the horizontal axis, θt = 1μ+
Y−(1+r)
Y
, but lower than the
point at which αt intersects the horizontal axis. On the other hand, C¯ intersects
γt for θt = Y−(1+r)Y , a point at which γt >αt . Hence, there exists a threshold θ
∗ ∈
[ Y−(1+r)
Y
, 1
μ+x
Y−(1+r)
Y
), such that C¯ >max[αt ,γt ] for θt ∈ [ Y−(1+r)Y ,θ∗). Now, in
this region, the size of the innovative sector in the first best is F (max[αt ,γt ]),
while in the second best it is F (C¯). Hence, for these values of θt , the size of the
innovative sector is larger under moral hazard than in the first best. The next
implication summarizes the above discussion.
Implication 8. Under moral hazard, when (18) holds, if the innovation is
not trapped, the growth rate of the innovative sector is strictly larger than
in the first best, as long as θt >θˆ . Furthermore, there exists a threshold θ∗ ∈
[ Y−(1+r)
Y
, 1
μ+x
Y−(1+r)
Y
), such that, for θt ∈ [ Y−(1+r)Y ,θ∗), the size of the innovative
sector is larger than in the first best.
The intuitive economic reason why moral hazard inflates the innovative
sector is that, as mentioned above, it spurs the entry of managers exerting low
effort. This fuels the growth of the sector. On the other hand, it lowers the
average expected surplus generated by investments in the innovative sector.
One could think this decline in expected surplus would deter investment
by principals. This is not the case because, in the pooling equilibrium
of proposition 4, there is cross-subsidization of managers exerting low
effort by managers exerting high effort. The former receive higher expected
compensation than the (negative) surplus they generate for society; that is, they
earn rents. In contrast, the managers exerting high effort receive lower expected
compensation than the (positive) surplus they generate for society. Hence, the
expected losses incurred by investors hiring managers who turn out to exert
low effort are offset by their expected gains when hiring managers who turn
out exerting high effort. Thus, in a sense, the excessively inflated growth of
the innovative sector is funded by the subsidies of the managers exerting high
effort. And these subsidies result in agency rents for managers exerting low
effort, as stated in the next implication.
Implication 9. Under moral hazard, when (18) holds, for θt ∈ [ Y−(1+r)Y ,θ∗),
agents exerting low effort earn agency rents.
Taken together, implications 8 and 9 contrast with previous theoretical
results. To the extent that rents are transfers from principals to agents, they
17 This is reminiscent of the overinvestment result of De Meza and Webb (1987).
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tend to deter investment by managers. In this context, moral hazard reduces the
size of the sector relative to the first best, as, for example, in Axelson and Bond
(2011). This is not the case in the present model, where, in contrast withAxelson
and Bond (2011), not only effort but also the cost of effort are unobservable. In
this context, the rents earned by inefficient agents are funded by the efficient
agents, rather than the principals.
While the inflated growth of the innovative sector is privately optimal for the
managers exerting low effort, who would not have been hired in the first best, it
is socially costly: it drives expected utilitarian welfare below its first-best level,
due to the value-destroying entry of managers exerting low effort. This social
cost materializes when a negative shock hits and large losses are incurred due
to lack of risk prevention by low-effort managers. This is stated in the next
implication.
Implication 10. Under moral hazard, when (18) holds, for θ ∈ [ Y−(1+r)
Y
,θ∗),
default probabilities and aggregate losses in case of shock are higher than in
the first best.
4. Conclusion
Our analysis of the dynamics of innovations and risk under learning yields
two key insights: First, the strongest growth episodes of the innovative sector
are fueled by the entry of managers exerting low risk prevention effort - and
therefore correspond to a decline in risk prevention standards. Second, under
moral hazard, there is excessive entry of managers exerting low effort and
earning informational rents, so that the innovative sector is larger and riskier
than in the first best.
Thus, in our model, the signature of moral hazard is strong growth at early
stages of the development of the innovation. In the first best, early growth is
slow, because limited confidence implies only managers exerting high effort
should enter. Under asymmetric information, early growth is strong, in spite
of limited confidence, due to the entry of managers exerting low prevention
efforts, that cannot be screened from those exerting high prevention effort.
While the present model features only managers and investors, it would
be interesting to extend the analysis by introducing a supervisor or regulator,
better able than investors to monitor the managers’ risk management systems.
Because under asymmetric information there is excess entry of managers with
inefficient risk management systems, supervisory monitoring could improve
welfare by imposing compliance to risk management standards. When should
that occur? Our theoretical analysis suggests that strong growth should not
be taken as an encouraging sign that the innovation is healthy, calling for
“light-touch regulation.” Quite to the contrary, it is in periods of strong growth
that resources should be spent to monitor the innovative sector, check risk
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prevention standards, and bar entry for institutions with weak risk management
systems.
Also, while our results obtain with rational agents, they could be amplified by
psychological biases, such as, e.g., overconfidence. After a few years without
negative shocks, overconfident market participants would become excessively
confident that the innovation is strong.18 This would magnify the effects we
analyze, reduce risk prevention further, and make the innovative sector more
vulnerable.
Appendix. Complement to the Proof of Proposition 3
In the text we showed that, when θ > [Y −(1+r)]/Y,there cannot be two contracts in equilibrium,
one inducing high effort only, and the other inducing low effort only. We now show that the proof
extends to rule out the situation in which one of the two contracts would attract both managers
exerting high effort and managers exerting low effort.
The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose there were two contracts:
• mboth, inducing low effort by a fraction x of the managers who choose it and high effort
by the remaining fraction,
• and mhigh, inducing only high effort.
If one of these two contracts gave higher compensation for high effort than the other, then
all managers exerting high effort would choose the former, and the latter would not attract any
manager. Thus, for both contracts to attract managers exerting high effort, it must be that they give
managers the same expected pay-off conditionally on e=1; that is,
(1−θ )mboth(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ)mboth(ξ =1)=(1−θ )mhigh(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ)mhigh(ξ =1).
Moreover competition between investors implies they exactly breakeven for each of the two
contracts; that is,
(1−θ )mhigh(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ)mhigh(ξ =1)=(1−θμ)Y −(1+r),
and
(1−θ )mboth(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ−x)mboth(ξ =1)=(1−θμ−θx)Y −(1+r).
Equality of expected transfers conditional on high effort along with the breakeven condition for
mhigh imply
(1−θ )mboth(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ)mboth(ξ =1)=(1−θμ)Y −(1+r).
Substracting from the breakeven condition for mboth, this yields mboth(ξ =1)=Y . Substituting
mboth(ξ =1)=Y into the breakeven condition for mboth, we have
mboth(ξ =0)=Y − 1+r1−θ ,
which contradicts the limited liability condition that mboth(ξ =0)≥0 when θ > [Y −(1+r)]/Y .
Thus, when θ > (Y −(1+r))/Y , it cannot be the case, in equilibrium, that one contract attracts only
managers exerting high effort, whereas the other attracts both managers exerting high effort and
18 This is consistent with the approach taken by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) or Gervais and
Odean (2001). In their models, however, agents overestimate the precision of private signals, whereas here they
would overestimate the precision of public signals.
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managers exerting low effort. Reasoning along similar lines, one rules out the case in which one
contract attracts managers exerting low effort only, whereas the other attracts managers exerting
high effort, as well as managers exerting low effort.
Finally, we rule out the possibility that there would be two different contracts, m1 and m2, each
attracting both managers exerting high effort and managers exerting low effort. For both contracts
to attract managers exerting high effort,
(1−θ )m1(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ)m1(ξ =1)=(1−θ )m2(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ)m2(ξ =1).
For both contracts to attract managers exerting low effort,
(1−θ )m1(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ−)m1(ξ =1)=(1−θ )m2(ξ =0)+θ (1−μ−)m2(ξ =1).
Substracting the latter equality from the former, we get m1(ξ =1)=m2(ξ =1). Substituting, we get
m1(ξ =0)=m2(ξ =0). Hence, we cannot have two different contracts.
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